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The Standard of Proof for Federal Trademark
Dilution Claims has Recently been Sharpened by
the United States Supreme Court, Thereby
Eliminating the "Likelihood of Dilution" Standard:
Moseley v. Victoria's Secret Catalogue, Inc.
TRADEMARK LAW - DILUTION - STANDARD OF PROOF - The
Supreme Court of the United States held that complainants under
the federal trademark dilution act must prove actual dilution.
Moseley v. Victoria's Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
In February of 1998, Victor Moseley and his wife Cathy opened
a small gift and novelty store called Victor's Secret in a strip mall
in Elizabethtown, Kentucky.1 The Moseley's store sold various
adult products, including lingerie.! They advertised the opening of
their store in some local newspapers.3 The advertisement caught
the attention of Colonel John E. Baker, a member of the Judge
Advocate General on an army base.4 The Colonel sent a letter and
the advertisement to the corporate headquarters of Victoria's Se-
cret.5 Upon receipt, Victoria's Secret's counsel wrote the Moseleys
a cease and desist letter claiming that the use of "Victor's Secret"
1. Appellant's Brief at 3. See also Appellee's Brief at 4. Victor Moseley had been out
of work and wanted to keep this business secret from his old employer, hence the name
"Victor's Secret." Appellant's Brief at 3.
2. Moseley v. Victoria's Secret Catalogue, Inc. 537 U.S. 418 (2003). See also Appel-
lant's Brief at 4. In an answer to interrogatories, the Moseleys explained that they sold
various products, including "novelty action clocks, patches, temporary tattoos, stuffed ani-
mals, coffee mugs, leather biker wallets, zippo lighters, diet formula, diet supplements,
jigsaw puzzles, whyss, handcuffs, hosiery, bubble machines, greeting cards, calendars,
incense burners, car air fresheners, sunglasses, ball caps, jewelry, candles, lava lamps,
blacklights, fiber optic lights, rock and roll prints, lingerie, pages, candy, adult video tapes,
adult novelties, t-shirts, etc". Moseley, 537 U.S. at 424.
3. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 423. One of the advertisements appeared in "Inside The Tur-
ret," a newspaper of the United States army base at Fort Knox. Appellant's Brief at 4.
4. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 423. Colonel John Baker was a Staff Judge in the Judge Ad-
vocate General. Appellee's Brief at 4.
5. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 423. Colonel Baker was offended by the advertisement as, in
his view, he thought Victor's Secret was ruining the reputable trademark of Victoria's Se-
cret through tarnishing of the mark. Appellee's Brief at 4.
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was likely to cause consumer confusion and dilute the distinctive-
ness of "Victoria's Secret," their federally registered trademark.6
Victoria's Secret operates over 750 stores nationwide, two of
which are located in Louisville, Kentucky, which is near Eliza-
bethtown, Kentucky The company also does business through
their catalogue.' Thirty-nine thousand copies of this catalogue
are distributed to residents of Elizabethtown, Kentucky.9 Victo-
ria's Secret sells reasonably priced lingerie in their stores nation-
wide and through their catalogue. 10 In 1998, Victoria's Secret did
more than 1.5 billion dollars in business.
Upon receipt of the cease and desist letter from Victoria's Se-
cret's counsel, the Moseleys changed the store's name to "Victor's
Little Secret."2 However, this change did not appease Victoria's
Secret's counsel, and they filed suit in federal court two months
later. 3 The Victoria's Secret complaint contained four causes of
action: (1) federal trademark infringement in violation of 15 U.S.C
§1114(1); (2) unfair competition for misrepresentation in violation
of 15 U.S.C. 1125(a); (3) federal dilution in violation of the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act; and (4) claims directed at unfair compe-
tition and trademark infringement in violation of the common law
of Kentucky. 4
After discovery in this matter, both parties motioned for sum-
mary judgment in the district court." The United States District
Court for the Western District of Kentucky granted summary
judgment to the Moseleys on the federal and state trademark in-
6. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 423. Victoria's Secret federally registered the mark in 1981.
Appellee's Brief at 2.
7. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 422. The two Victoria's Secret Stores located in Louisville,
Kentucky opened in 1985 and 1992, respectively. Appellee's Brief at 3.
8. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 423. Victoria's Secret distributes about 400 million copies of
their catalogue each year. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 423.
9. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 423.
10. Id. at 424.
11. Id. at 423.
12. Id. In the advertisements and the store's logo the word "little" is much smaller
than the words "Victor's" and "Secret." Appellee's Brief at 4-5.
13. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 423. Victoria's Secret counsel, upon being advised of the name
change, requested more information about the Moseley's store. Id. Their counsel decided
that the name change to "Victor's Little Secret" was not satisfactory to avoid a lawsuit. Id.
14. Id. at 423-24.
15. Id. at 424. The Moseley's motion asked for summary judgment on all counts. Appel-
lee's Brief at 5. Victoria's Secret only motioned for summary judgment on the federal dilu-
tion claim, relying on an affidavit by an expert which stated the "enormous value" of the
Victoria's Secret mark. Moseley, 537 U.S. 424. This affidavit did not comment on the im-
pact that "Victor's Secret" had on the economic value of "Victoria's Secret" mark. Id. at
424-25.
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fringement and the unfair competition claims, finding that no like-
lihood of confusion existed as a matter of law.1" However, the
court granted summary judgment to Victoria's Secret on the fed-
eral dilution claim. 7 After finding for Victoria's Secret on the di-
lution claim, the district court enjoined the Moseleys from using
the name "Victor's Little Secret." 8 The Moseleys appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.'9
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the injunc-
tion and the grant of summary judgment on the federal dilution
claim."0 The majority decided two main issues: (1) whether the
Victoria's Secret mark was distinctive; and (2) whether relief could
be granted using a likelihood of dilution standard, without actual
evidence of dilution.2' With respect to the first issue, the majority
held that the Victoria's Secret mark was distinctive.22 The court
decided that relief under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act
could be granted without actual evidence of dilution, as suggested
by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit22 in Nabisco, Inc. v.
PF Brands, Inc.24 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ex-
pressly rejected the holding in Ringling Brothers-Barnum & Bai-
ley Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev.,25 which held
that evidence of actual harm must be established for relief to be
granted under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act.2 Hence, the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit agreed with the district
court that dilution had been proven and summary judgment was
appropriate.27
Citing a split in the circuit courts regarding the "actual harm"
standard for Federal Trademark Dilution Claims," the Supreme
16. Id. at 425.
17. Id. The Moseleys did not challenge the fame of the Victoria's Secret trademark. Id.
The court found that the Victoria's Secret mark was tarnished by the use of Victor's Little
Secret. Id.
18. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 425.
19. Id. Victoria's Secret did not cross-appeal, which dismissed Victoria's Secret's claims
for federal and state trademark infringement and unfair competition. Appellee's Brief at 8.
20. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 425.
21. Id. at 425-26.
22. Id. at 426. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the Victoria's Secret
mark fell into the categories of "fanciful" or "arbitrary" on the trademark spectrum. Id.
23. Id. at 427.
24. 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999).
25. 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999).
26. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 428.
27. Id. at 427.
28. Id. at 428.
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Court granted the Moseley's petition for certiorari29 to determine
whether "objective proof of actual injury to the economic value of a
famous mark (as opposed to a presumption of harm arising from a
subjective 'likelihood of dilution' standard) is a requisite for relief
under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act."' The majority, led by
Justice Stevens in a unanimous decision, held that the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act requires evidence of actual harm for dilu-
tion claims to be sustained.31
The Supreme Court began its analysis by scrutinizing a 1927
law review article12 by Frank Schechter." This article concluded,
in pertinent part, "that the preservation of the uniqueness of a
trademark should constitute the only rational basis for its protec-
tion."' Schechter based his conclusions on a German case where
the court concluded that a well-known manufacturer of a mouth-
wash, using the "Odol" trademark, could prevent others from us-
ing that same trademark on non-competing steel products.35
Schechter reasoned that trademarks classified within the arbi-
trary or fanciful areas of the trademark spectrum add to our hu-
man vocabulary and should receive a higher standard of protec-
tion against use by others, as opposed to trademarks which are
common words already a part of our language. 6
The Court next delved into the legislative history of the Lanham
Act, giving special consideration to the Federal Trademark Dilu-
tion Act.37 Justice Stevens critiqued the 1988 amendments to the
act and took special note of an antidilution provision which failed
to be enacted.38 In 1995, a dilution bill39 was introduced in the
29. Moseley v. Victoria's Secret Catalogue, Inc. 535 U.S. 985 (2002).
30. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 421-22.
31. Id. at 418-19.
32. Frank Schechter, Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813
(1927).
33. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 429.
34. Schechter, supra note 32, at 831.
35. Id. at 831-32.
36. Id. at 828-29. Some examples Schechter gave of common words used as trademarks
included Blue Ribbon, Star, Anchor, and Gold Metal. Id. In Schechter's view, terms like:
Rolls-Royce, Aunt Jemima's, Kodak, Mazda and Corona are within the fanciful or arbitrary
areas of the trademark spectrum, and they deserve a high degree of protection against
trademark dilution because they have added to our language. Id.
37. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 430-31.
38. Id. at 431. The antidilution amendment failed because of some First Amendment
concerns, especially freedom of expression. Id.
39. H.R. 1295, 104h Cong. (1" Sess. 1995).
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House of Representatives and passed after a one-day hearing.4°
Only one amendment to the bill was made during the hearing.1
The House found that the purpose of the law was to "protect fa-
mous trademarks from subsequent uses that blur the distinctive-
ness of the mark or tarnish or disparage it, even in the absence of
a likelihood of confusion. 4 2 The dilution bil 4 3 was then introduced
and passed in the Senate.44 One senator said the bill was passed
"to protect famous trademarks from subsequent uses that blur the
distinctiveness of the mark or tarnish or disparage it.' 5 This bill
eventually became the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA) of
1995.46
The Court then noted that the Victoria's Secret mark is very
valuable and famous, and further observed that the Moseleys have
not challenged that conclusion.47 Justice Stevens explained that
the Moseleys did not submit that statutory protection lies only in
identical uses of famous marks. 8 The majority interpreted the
district court's ruling to rest upon tarnishment of the Victoria's
Secret trademark by the Moseleys. 4' Looking to the Court of Ap-
peals' decision, the Court found the holding to rest not only upon
tarnishment but also upon blurring.0
Justice Stevens analyzed state dilution statutes and the
Lanham Act to help interpret the meaning of the Federal Trade-
mark Dilution Act.5' He noted that the state dilution statutes and
40. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 431. This dilution bill housed two provisions that overcame
Congress's First Amendment concerns with a dilution statute. Id. A first provision permits
"'fair use' of a registered trademark in comparative advertising or promotion." Id. A sec-
ond provision states that "noncommercial uses of the mark will not constitute dilution." Id.
The hearing was held before the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property of the
House Judiciary Committee. Id.
41. Id. The amendment extended protection under the dilution statute to unregistered
trademarks, as
opposed to only registered trademarks. Id.
42. Id. The House gave some examples of dilution that would be actionable under the
new statute; including "DUPONT shoes, BUICK aspirin and KODAK pianos." Id.
43. S. 1513, 104Vh Cong. (1" Sess. 1995).
44. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 431.
45. Id. See also 141 S. Cong. Rec. 38559-38561 (1995). The Senator also referred to
Dupont shoes, Buick aspirin, and Kodak piano as examples of actionable dilution and fur-
ther made reference to the Schechter law review article. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 431; See also
141 Cong. Rec. 38559-38561 (1995).
46. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 431.




51. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 432-33.
52. Id. at 433.
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several clauses in the Lanham Act specifically referred to a "like-
lihood" of dilution instead of actual dilution.52 The relevant provi-
sion in the FTDA specifically refers to the phrase "causes dilution"
instead of "causes a likelihood of dilution".53 The Court held that
the text of the FTDA specifically requires proof of actual dilution,
instead of proof of a likelihood of dilution.54
The Court explained that proving actual dilution does not nec-
essarily mean having hard evidence of lost sales or profits.55 Jus-
tice Stevens then rejected the conclusions in Ringling Brothers-
Barum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel
Dev.,5" which stated to the contrary.57 The Court, however, did
agree with a part of the opinion where the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals explained that mental association of a junior mark with a
famous mark is not enough to establish dilution.58 Justice Stevens
clarified the theory of mental association by pointing out that it
will not necessarily reduce the capacity of the famous mark to dis-
tinguish its goods from the junior user.59 The majority decided
that blurring and tarnishment are not necessary results of mental
association.0
The Court found that although Colonel Baker made a mental
association between Victor's Little Secret and Victoria's Secret,
this mental association did not change his impression of the qual-
ity of Victoria's Secret's goods, thus indicating that there was no
53. Id. at 432-33. The FTDA reads, in pertinent part: "The owner of a famous mark
shall be entitled. . . to an injunction against another person's commercial use in commerce
of a mark or trade name, if such use begins after the mark has become famous and caused
dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000). The term
"dilution" means "the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish
goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of (1) competition between the
owner of the famous mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or
deception." 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
54. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433.
55. Id.
56. 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999).
57. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433.
58. Id. The circuit court made this finding only where the marks at issue were not
identical. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 434.
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tarnishment.6 1 The majority also found that there was no evidence
of the lessening of the capacity of Victoria's Secret, through their
mark, to distinguish the goods sold at their stores and in their
catalog.62 Further, Justice Stevens concluded that the expert Vic-
toria's Secret retained only spoke to the value of their mark, and
did not touch on the impact that Victor's Little Secret had on the
mark. 3
Justice Stevens noted that Victoria's Secret had argued that
proof of actual dilution, through consumer surveys and other
methods, would be difficult and costly to obtain.' Justice Stevens,
however, stated that direct evidence may not be necessary if cir-
cumstantial evidence can satisfactorily prove actual dilution.65
The Court pointed out that even though evidence of actual dilution
may be hard to obtain, not requiring it would dispense with an
essential element of the FTDA, which would obviously be im-
proper." The majority concluded its analysis by stating that the
evidence currently present in the record, related to actual dilution,
could not sustain the summary judgement motion on the FTDA
claim.6
Justice Kennedy, in his concurrence, first mentioned that no is-
sue of famousness of the Victoria's Secret mark has arisen in this
case, and therefore the mark is famous." Next, he moved to the
issue of which factors should be considered by the courts to estab-
lish dilution.69 The concurrence relied on the term "capacity"
within the language of the FTDA.7 Justice Kennedy observed
that some cases may turn on the probable detrimental effects a
competing mark's commercial use may have on the famous mark."
The Justice noted that, if proven, the diminished "capacity" of
the famous mark to distinguish its goods and services, both pres-
61. Id. The Court explained that Colonel Baker was appalled by Victor's Little Secret
store, yet noted that this did not change the Colonel's impression of Victoria's Secret's
goodwill. Id.
62. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 434.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. Justice Stevens further explained that when the marks at issue are identical,
circumstantial evidence could more readily be used to prove actual dilution. Id.
66. Id.
67. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 434.
68. Id. at 435 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
69. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
70. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy is referring to the phrase "the less-
ening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services,"
quoted from the FTDA at 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000). Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
71. Id. at 435-36 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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ently and in the future, could lead to a showing of dilution. 2 Jus-
tice Kennedy then observed, that if a competing mark diminishes
the power of a famous mark to distinguish its goods and services
and provide customers with an assurance of high quality, then
dilution may be established.73
Erosion of the famous mark's capacity can be proven by prob-
able detrimental effects set in motion by the commercial use of the
junior user's mark. 4 Justice Kennedy noted that injunctive relief
is available under the FTDA." Citing Swift & Co. v. United
States,76 Justice Kennedy observed that the injunctive relief is to
"prevent future wrong, although no right has yet been violated."'
The Justice noted that equity principles encourage injured parties
to enforce their rights swiftly." The concurrence explained that
injured parties should not be forced to wait until erosion of their
trademark's capacity to distinguish goods is lost before they can
obtain injunctive relief.9
Justice Kennedy then referred to the district court's opinion
wherein dilution by tarnishment was found, and to the court of
appeals' opinion wherein dilution by blurring was found. 0 The
Justice concluded by stating that the majority's opinion does not
bar injunctive relief to Victoria's Secret if sufficient evidence of
blurring or tarnishment is proven upon remand.8'
"The adoption of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act in 1995,
which incorporated a federal dilution cause of action into the 1946
Lanham Act, was preceded by a great deal of debate.' Prior to its
enactment, about twenty-five states had antidilution statutes,
and the standards for a finding of dilution differed greatly from
72. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 435 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Capacity is defined as "the
power or ability to hold, receive, or accommodate." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 330 (1961). Capacity has also been defined as the "power of receiving, contain-
ing, or absorbing." Id. See also WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 396
(2d ed. 1949).
73. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 435 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
74. Id. at 435-36 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
75. Id. at 436 (Kennedy, J., concurring); See also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2) (2000).
76. 276 U.S. 311 (1928).
77. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 436 (Kennedy, J., concurring). See also Swift, 276 U.S. at 326.
78. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 436 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
79. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
80. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
81. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
82. Mathais Strasser, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection Revisited: Putting
the Dilution Doctrine into Context, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 375,
376 (2000).
83. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 436.
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state to state84 In 1988, Congress considered adding an antidilu-
tion clause to the Lanham Act; however, this bill never passed be-
cause of the freedom of expression concerns of some members of
Congress. 5
The purpose of the FTDA was to permit owners of famous, dis-
tinctive marks to have a remedy for dilution of their marks.86
Congress enacted the FTDA "because famous marks are used on a
nationwide basis and dilution protection is currently only avail-
able on a patch-quilt system of protection ... further, court deci-
sions have been inconsistent and some courts are reluctant to
grant nationwide injunctions for violations of state law where half
of the states have no dilution law." 7 While other provisions of the
Lanham Act are directed to protecting consumers from being mis-
led as to the source and quality of the goods,88 the FTDA was en-
acted to protect the trademark owner's property right in the
mark.89 Since it was enacted, various circuit courts of appeal have
interpreted the language of the FTDA differently." The two lead-
ing cases, each reaching a different conclusion on the "actual
harm" issue, are Nabisco, Inc. v. Pepperidge Farm Brands9 and
Ringling Brothers-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v.
Utah Div. of Travel Dev.9"
Setting aside the leading cases for a moment, one of the first
cases to define a dilution test was Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toep-
pen."' Here, the issue was whether registering a domain name on
the Internet, using another's registered trademark, was actionable
dilution as defined by the FTDA.94 The Panavision court applied
the following test to determine if Panavision had proven dilution:
84. Victoria's Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464, 468 (6th Cir. 2001).
85. Rep. No. 100-1028 (1988).
85. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 431.
87. 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1032.
88. 15 U.S.C. §§1114, 1125(a)(1)(A) (1994).
89. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 429.
90. Id. at 427-28.
91. 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999). The court in Nabisco found the appropriate standard
to be a "likelihood of dilution." Id.
92. 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999). The court in Ringling Brothers interpreted the dilu-
tion statute to require proof of actual harm. Id.
93. 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
94. Id. at 1318. In this case, Toeppen registered the domain name for the plaintiffs
registered trademark "Panavision" without Panavision's consent. Id. at 1319. Toeppen,
after being contacted by Panavision, offered to sell the rights to the domain name to Panav-
ision for $ 13,000. Id. Panavision refused to buy the domain name from Toeppen and sued
him under the FTDAK Id. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Panav-
ision on the FTDA claim. Id.
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"1) the mark is famous; 2) the defendant is making a commercial
use of the mark in commerce; 3) the defendant's use began after
the mark became famous; [and] 4) the defendant's use of the mark
dilutes the quality of the mark by diminishing the capacity of the
mark to identify and distinguish goods."95
Because the parties did not dispute elements one and three, the
Panavision Court only ruled on elements two and four.96 The court
first analyzed element two, concerning "commercial use" within
the meaning of the FTDA. The majority held that Toeppen had
commercially used the domain names.97 During their analysis, the
justices explained that because Toeppen had frequently purchased
domain names of registered trademarks and then attempted to
sell them back to the trademark owner, he was in the business of
doing such, and therefore this was a commercial use.98 The court
then discussed whether Toeppen's use had "caused dilution" to the
Panavision marks.99 The majority believed that because Toeppen
had the capability of posting anything he wished on the web sites,
he could easily dilute the Panavision trademarks by tarnishment
or blurring.'0 The court further reasoned that because many con-
sumers would key in "panavision.com" when looking for the
Panavision web site, another form of dilution had occurred.' The
court granted relief to Panavision using a "likelihood of dilution"
standard.102
The leading case ruling that proof of actual dilution must be
proven is Ringling Brothers. °3 The Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals was asked to decide whether the district court properly
granted summary judgment in favor of Utah when Ringling-
Brothers attempted to prove actual dilution by blurring, using a
hypothetical consumer survey.0 4 The majority found that to suc-
ceed on its dilution claim, Ringling Brothers had to prove "(1) that
95. Id. at 1324.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1325.
98. Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1325-26.
99. Id. at 1326.
100. Id. at 1326-27.
101. Id. at 1327.
102. Id.
103. 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999). In this case, the plaintiff (circus) trademarked the
slogan "The Greatest Show on Earth," and defendant, the state of Utah, registered the
slogan "The Greatest Snow on Earth". Id. The circus filed suit against the State of Utah
under the FTDA. Id. The district court ruled for the defendant at summary judgment
because no proof of actual economic harm had been proven by the plaintiff. Id.
104. Id. at 452.
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its mark was a famous one; (2) that Utah adopted its mark after
the Ringling Brothers' mark had become famous; and (3) that
Utah has made use of a junior mark sufficiently similar to the fa-
mous mark to evoke in a relevant universe of consumers a mental
association of the two that had caused actual economic harm to
the famous mark's economic value by lessening its former selling
power as an advertising agent for its goods or services."''
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that Ringling
Brothers had carried part of their burden at trial by showing un-
disputed evidence of famousness before Utah began using its
mark."°6 The majority then turned to element three of the dilution
test to determine if dilution by blurring had been proven.0 7 At the
district court, Ringling Brothers argued that dilution by blurring
could be proven if the "junior mark is either identical to or suffi-
ciently similar to the famous mark that a person viewing the two
instinctively will make a mental association between the two." '0s
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this contention and
explained that mental association by consumers was not sufficient
to prove dilution.' 9 The majority investigated the results of the
hypothetical consumer survey and found that almost every con-
sumer did not relate the phrase "The Greatest Show on Earth,"
with the phrase "The Greatest Snow on Earth"." ' The court con-
cluded by stating that the consumer survey produced by Ringling
Brothers did not prove any actual harm was caused to the Ring-
ling Brothers' mark by Utah's use of "The Greatest Snow on
Earth," and therefore, Ringling Brothers did not prove dilution
under the FTDA."
The leading case holding that a "likelihood of dilution" standard
will suffice to prove dilution within the meaning of the FTDA is
Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc."' In this case, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals was asked to decide whether the district court
105. Id. at 452, 461.
106. Id. at 452.
107. Ringling Brothers, 170 F.3d at 452.
108. Id. The court in Ringling Brothers noted that the two marks at issue were not
identical, but asserted that the two marks were so sufficiently similar that it required as a
matter of law mental association, and hence dilution by blurring. Id. Ringling Brothers
also produced a survey of hypothetical viewers to establish the mental association. Id. at
452-53. This survey required consumers to fill in the blank in the phrase "The Greatest
on Earth." Id. at 462.
109. Id. at 453.
110. Id.at463.
111. Id.at463.
112. 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999).
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correctly ruled that Nabisco Brands could be subject to a prelimi-
nary injunction for a violation of the FTDA when Pepperidge
Farm had only proven that there was a "likelihood of dilution" and
had not established actual dilution."3 The court applied the fol-
lowing dilution test: "1) the senior mark must be famous; 2) it
must be distinctive; 3) the junior use must be a commercial use in
commerce; 4) it must begin after the senior mark has become fa-
mous; and 5) it must cause dilution of the distinctive quality of the
senior mark."
114
The court found that elements 1, 3, and 4 were proven by Pep-
peridge Farm during the hearing for the Preliminary Injunction."'
The only two elements left in question were elements two and
five." First, the court addressed element two, analyzing the term
"distinctiveness".1 1 7  Distinctiveness is measured by a sliding,
three-phase scale."' The majority found that the Pepperidge
Farm goldfish mark fell somewhere in the middle of the scale and
was reasonably distinct."9 One reason the court placed the gold-
fish trademark in the middle of the distinctiveness scale, and not
the top, was that cookies and crackers had previously been animal
shaped. 2° Therefore, the court concluded that element two had
been satisfied by Pepperidge Farm. 2'
Turning to element five, the court examined the holding and ra-
tionale of Ringling Brothers,2 requiring actual consummated
harm by dilution, and specifically rejected that holding. 23 First,
the majority explained that the Fourth Circuit's interpretation
could be viewed in two different ways.2 4 The first method of in-
113. Id. at 214. This case arose because Nabisco starting making fish shaped crackers
similar to the goldfish crackers produced and federally registered by Pepperidge Farm. Id.
at 213. Pepperidge Farm asked for a preliminary injunction to stop Nabisco from produc-
ing the crackers. Id.
114. Id. at 215.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 215.
118. Id. at 215-16. On one end of the scale are fanciful marks, which have a very high
degree of distinctiveness, in the middle are arbitrary marks, which have a reasonable de-
gree of distinctiveness, and on the other end of the scale are suggestive marks, which are
have a lower degree of distinctiveness. Id.
119. Id. at 216.
120. Id. at 217. Further, the majority reasoned that the highest degree of distinctive-
ness was reserved for fanciful marks like Kodak, not trademarks like Pepperidge Farm's
goldfish. Id.
121. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 217.
122. Ringling Brothers, 170 F.3d 449.
123. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 223.
124. Id.
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terpretation would narrowly construe the holding to mean that
"courts may not infer dilution from contextual factors but must
instead rely on evidence of actual loss of revenues or the skillfully
constructed consumer survey."'25 The Nabisco court rejected this
narrow interpretation, finding that evidence of actual economic
loss would be almost impossible to prove, and further finding that
circumstantial evidence has been allowed in the past to prove
claims and should not be foregone as a solid source of proof.'26
Then, the majority turned to the broader interpretation of the
Ringling Brothers holding, and they also rejected this type of
analysis.'27 The Nabisco Court stated that the broader view of the
holding would require "not only that dilution be proved by a show-
ing of lost revenues or surveys but also that the junior be already
established in the marketplace before the senior could seek an in-
junction."26 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals did, however,
notice that the language in the FTDA reads "causes dilution," and
could be interpreted as in Ringling Brothers, but instead held that
the statute's intent was a "likelihood of dilution" standard for
proving dilution.29  The Nabisco court held that a "likelihood of
dilution" standard should be used to interpret FTDA claims.
130
In a more recent case, decided in April of 2000, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit interpreted the FTDA in Kellogg Co. v.
Exxon Corp.3' Here the dilution issue arose between the use of
Kellogg's federally registered "Tony The Tiger" trademark and
Exxon's federally registered "Whimsical Tiger" trademark. 132 The
district court granted summary judgment for Exxon, but the court
of appeals reversed.'33 The Kellogg court did not pursue a full dilu-
tion analysis because it was not required for resolution of the case;
however, it did adopt the Second Circuit's Nabisco test for estab-
lishing dilution under the FTDA.134 The majority explained that
the Sixth Circuit courts would use the following test to inquire
125. Id.
126. Id. at 223-24.
127. Id. at 224.
128. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 224.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. 209 F.3d 562 (6th Cir. 2000), overruled in part by Moseley v. Victoria's Secret Cata-
logue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
132. Id. at 564.
133. Id. at 562. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed for reasons other
than an FTDA interpretation, such as improper ruling on the affirmative defenses of acqui-
escence and progressive encroachment. Id.
134. Id. at 577.
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whether the plaintiff has proved dilution: "1) the senior mark
must be famous; 2) it must be distinctive; 3) the junior use must
be a commercial use in commerce; 4) it must begin after the senior
mark has become famous; and 5) it must cause dilution of the dis-
tinctive quality of the senior mark.' 35 Further, the Kellogg court
ruled that a "likelihood of dilution" standard would be used in the
Sixth Circuit, as opposed to the "actual dilution" standard applied
by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Ringling Brothers.136
Finally, the court concluded that a distinctiveness analysis must
be conducted as it was in Nabisco for proper establishment of dilu-
tion claims.'37
An even more recent case came in June of 2000, when the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals decided Westchester Media v. PRL USA
Holdings, Inc.3' Here, a suit was brought by Westchester Media
against Polo Ralph Lauren Corp. (PRL) seeking a declaratory
judgment to use the "Polo" trademark in its magazine. 9 PRL
counter claimed for, inter alia, federal trademark dilution.140 The
court adopted the view of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals for
proving trademark dilution and explained that to prevail on the
dilution claim, PRL had to prove "that its marks are famous and
distinctive; that Westchester adopted its mark after PRL's mark
had become famous and distinctive; and that Westchester caused
dilution of PRL's mark."' The parties herein only disputed
whether the actual dilution standard was correct under the
FTDA. 142
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed both standards and
held that proof of actual dilution was required under the FTDA.
4 3
First, the court adopted the view of the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Ringling Brothers,4 4 stating that this interpretation of
the FTDA was closest to the actual meaning of the statute.'45 The
135. Id.
136. Kellogg, 209 F.3d at 577.
137. Id.
138. 214 F.3d 658 (5th Cir. 2000).
139. Id. at 663.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 670.
142. Id. Westchester argued that proof of actual dilution was the correct standard, while
PRL argued that a likelihood of dilution standard was more within the meaning of the
statute. Id.
143. Westchester, 214 F.3d at 670. Westchester relied upon the Fourth Circuit's opinion
in Ringling Brothers; PRL relied upon the Second Circuit's opinion in Nabisco. Id.
144. 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999).
145. Westchester, 214 F.3d at 670.
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Fifth Circuit examined the language in many state antidilution
statutes and noticed reference to a "likelihood of dilution" stan-
dard, as opposed to the "causes dilution" standard invoked in the
FTDA.'46 The court further decided that since the term "dilution"
in the FTDA was in the present tense and not modified by any
other word, the proof of actual dilution standard was fully sup-
ported. 4 7 Lastly, the court pointed out that the FTDA refers to
"another person's use," not "another person's threatened use,"
which further solidifies use of the actual dilution standard. 14 8
The court then critiqued the Second's Circuit's decision in Na-
bisco, 1 9 rejecting the holding.'5 ° The justices could not find any
support in the language of the FTDA for the "likelihood of dilu-
tion" standard employed by Nabisco.' The court held that they
could not refute the plain meaning of the statute by adopting the
Second Circuit's interpretation, which requires the use of an ac-
tual dilution standard in interpreting FTDA claims.' Finally, the
court ruled that PRL's FTDA claim was barred because no proof of
actual dilution had been found by the magistrate judge.'
In analyzing the issue of whether actual harm to the economic
value of a famous mark must be proven to establish dilution under
the FTDA, it appears that the Supreme Court followed the Fourth
Circuit's interpretation. The Fourth Circuit decided that proof of
actual dilution must be proven to make out a prima facie case for
trademark dilution under the FTDA.' 4  The Supreme Court in
Moseley'5 followed the strict meaning of the FTDA in its holding.
The justices closely scrutinized the language of the FTDA, espe-
cially the phrase "causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the
famous mark," in interpreting the statute.' 6 The Court's analysis
could not have been more correct in that the FTDA specifically
requires the competing mark to "cause" dilution, and not merely
cause a "likelihood of dilution," as set forth in the Fourth Circuit's
interpretation. The FTDA lacks any mention of a "likelihood"
146. Id. at 670-71.
147. Id. at 671.
148. Id.
149. 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999).




154. Ringling Brothers, 170 F.3d at 463. The Fourth Circuit stated that mere mental
association by consumers was not sufficient to prove actual dilution. Id. at 453.
155. Moseley, 537 U.S. 418.
156. Id. at 433.
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standard in its wording, further supporting the Court's ruling.
5 7
The definition of the term "dilution" specifically states a "lessening
of the capacity of a famous mark," not a probability or likelihood of
the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark, again solidifying
the Court's accurate holding.
15
1
The Moseley'59 ruling creates a much higher burden of proof for
practitioners in proving FTDA claims. Now that litigants must
prove actual dilution, some may not attempt to bring an FTDA
claim where such claims are not reasonably colorable. Some of the
FTDA's limits are now laid out, limits which require a strict statu-
tory interpretation, and which prevent false trademark dilution
claims from being tacked onto trademark infringement and unfair
competition causes of action as standard practice. In the past,
many litigants frequently added dilution claims to trademark in-
fringement actions since the scope of the FTDA was ambiguous
and open to interpretation. Now that the Court has established a
firm meaning as to the "proof' issue, trial and appellate courts will
have better guidance in applying the FTDA uniformly.
The Supreme Court did, however, leave open a few issues that
the lower courts will have to resolve. First, the Court left for in-
terpretation the method of proving actual dilution. Is actual dilu-
tion proven by consumer surveys, expert testimony or even cir-
cumstantial evidence? It seems to be unclear how attorneys
should attempt to prove actual dilution in the future. Second, the
Court did not specifically address the issue of "fame."'60 Does the
term "fame" mean that the mark must be famous nationwide, or
does it mean that the mark must only be famous within its niche
or market? A third issue left for lower court resolution is distinct-
iveness. The question here is: does distinctiveness mean inherent
distinctiveness,"' or will acquired distinctiveness'62 suffice? All
157. The FTDA reads, in pertinent part: ""The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled
* . . to an injunction against another person's commercial use in commerce of a mark or
trade name, if such use begins after the mark has become famous and cause dilution of the
distinctive quality of the mark... " 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000).
158. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
159. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 418.
160. Fame is the degree of recognition by either consumers in a niche market or the
general public. Thane Int'l v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894, 908 (9th Cir. 2002).
161. Inherent distinctiveness occurs when a trademark falls within the arbitrary, fanci-
ful or suggestive categories. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 210-11
(2000).
162. Acquired distinctiveness is established either through continued use in commerce
or five years of trademark registration on the supplemental register. Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at
211.
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these issues must be resolved by the lower courts to clearly and
fully define the dilution test under the FTDA.
The lower courts need to fully understand the Court's opinion to
accurately apply it on a routine basis. The trial and appellate
courts must realize that presently, the most essential elements of
a FTDA claim are 1) proof of actual dilution of 2) a distinctive and
famous mark. The trial courts can not be permitted to grant a
dilution claim on anything less, without being overturned on ap-
peal. The Supreme Court in Moseley163 clearly established that the
phase "causes dilution" in the FTDA means proof of actual dilu-
tion, no exceptions.
Christian M. Best
163. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 418.
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